

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 01 OF 12 310336Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310415Z 076913 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2540
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 01 OF 12 310336Z

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 12 USNATO 1833

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, PFOR, PARM
SUBJECT: PARM- ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT PART I

REF: (A) CERP 0001, (NOTAL) (B) 76 USNATO 6625 (DTG 021149Z
DEC 76) (C) USNATO 744 (DTG 111045Z FEB 77) (NOTAL

SUMMARY: HERACLITUS REMINDS US THAT NOTING IS PERMANENT

EXCEPT CHANGE; THUS, IF WE APPLY A STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTION TO THE FUTURE CHALLENGES OF DEFENDING WESTERN EUROPE, WE ADOPT THIS TECHNIQUE CAUTIOUSLY, ONLY AS AN AID IN ASSESSING ELEMENTS LIKELY TO REMAIN CONSTANT AND THOSE WHOSE FUTURE IS CLOUDED, LIKE THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF FRANCE AND ITALY.

LOOKING TO THE EXTERNAL THREAT, IT IS LIKELY THAT DESPITE THE SENESCENCE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE FLAGGING PACE OF EASTERN ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE SOVIETS, UNIMPEDED BY POPULAR PRESSURES, WILL MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER, IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD, AND IN FAR-FLUNG DEPLOYMENTS. WE EXPECT NO CHANGES IN THE HOSTILITY OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY TOWARDS THE WEST, AND ESPECIALLY NATO, NOR IN THE CONTINUING SOVIET DETERMINATION TO SHIFT THE CORRELATION OF FORCES STEADILY IN THEIR FAVOR.

LOOKING TO WESTERN EUROPE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT OUR ALLIES WILL RESPOND TO THIS THREAT BY BECOMING A TOUGHER, MORE SPARTAN, LESS WELFARE-ORIENTED SOCIETY, OR ONE MORE SOCIALLY WILLING OR ECONOMICALLY ABLE TO DEVOTE GREATER RESOURCES TO DEFENSE. TO MAINTAIN EVEN THE CURRENT LEVEL OF REAL SPENDING, WE WILL NEED TO CONTINUE THE VIGOROUS EFFORTS WE HAVE OUTLINED IN THE PAST TO
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 01 OF 12 310336Z

SWAY THE ALLIES RESIST POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON DEFENSE SPENDING. INTERNALLY, THE ALLIANCE WILL BE AFFECTED BY NATIONAL POLITICAL CURRENTS: PROSPECTS ARE UNEASY IN PORTUGAL, FRANCE AND ITALY; FRAGILE ARE THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE UK, THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM AND TURKEY; AND THE DISPUTE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY FESTERS. WHILE IN SOME COUNTRIES DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR STRENGTHENING NATO, AS FOR EXAMPLE IN SPAIN, THEY ARE LIKELY TO ENTAIL DIVISIVENESS, INCREASED INTRA-ALLIANCE MANEUVERING, AND GROWING ECONOMIC DISPARITIES. ANOTHER CHALLENGE WILL BE TO RESIST ACCEDING TO A US-FRG ALLIANCE, WITH A UK-BENELUX ADJUNCT, INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTH, AND A POROUS NORTHERN FLANK.

THE ALLIANCE, BASICALLY HEALTHY NOW, WILL REMAIN SO IF IT CONTINUES TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE DEFENSE AND RESPONDS SKILLFULLY TO THE POLITICAL CHALLENGES AHEAD. WHILE MARGINAL TO SOME OF THE DEEPER CURRENTS SHAPING EUROPE, NATO CAN DEMONSTRATE THE ESSENTIALITY OF COLLECTIVE EFFORTS FOR WESTERN SECURITY, AND PROVIDE THE CONFIDENCE REQUISITE TO HEALTHY ACCOMMODATION TO INEVITABLE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE.

TO MAINTAIN NATO'S VIABILITY, IMAGINATIVE, DYNAMIC

US LEADERSHIP AND CONSTANT SENSITIVITY TO ALLIED CONCERNS WILL BE REQUIRED.

IN THIS REPORT, WE CONCENTRATE ON STEPS THE US SHOULD TAKE:

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 02 OF 12 310339Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310416Z 077031 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2541
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 02 OF 12 310339Z

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 12 USNATO 1833

FIRST, TO ADVANCE RECENT US FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO ALLIED SOLIDARITY (PAR A);
--SECOND, TO PREVENT A FURTHER EROSION OF THE
EAST-WEST CONVENTIONAL MILITARY BALANCE WHILE ACHIEVING
A MORE RATIONAL THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE
(PART B). END SUMMARY.

I. US INTERESTS

NATO IS THE INSTRUMENT THROUGH WHICH THE US AND
ITS ALLIES PRESERVE THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE,
DETER SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH, AND SUPPORT THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF WESTERN EUROPE. THROUGH
NATO THE US:
--ACHIEVES THE FORWARD DEFENSE OF THE US AND
PRESERVES THE ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC ASSETS OF ALLIES
WHOSE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION ARE VITAL;
--SUPPORTS A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH GERMAN MILITARY
POWER CAN BE ACCEPTED BY ITS WESTERN NEIGHBORS;
THE DEFENSE EFFORTS OF SMALLER ALLIES CAN BE CREDIBLE;
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS CONFLICT AMONG ALLIES WILL BE
LESS LIKELY;
--PROMOTES A BROAD CONSENSUS ON THE ALLIED
APPROACH TO THE EAST, AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A
MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP AT LOWER LEVELS OF TENSION
AND COST WITH THE USSR.

II. OVERVIEW

IN SEEKING TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY BALANCE, THE
US AND ITS ALLIES WILL FACE SOVIET FORCES THAT ARE
LIKELY TO CONTINUE, GRADUALLY AND STEADILY, TO IMPROVE
THEIR CAPABILITIES. THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF
SOVIET STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WILL
CONTINUE TO RAISE QUESTIONS IN EUROPE ABOUT ALLIED ABILITIES
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 02 OF 12 310339Z

TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE IN THOSE DIMENSIONS.
INCREASES IN SOVIET CONVENTIONAL LAND AND TACTICAL AIR
FORCES MAY CONTINUE TO OUTSTRIP THE UNEVEN MODERNIZATION
OF NATO COUNTERPARTS. ALLIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED
BY THE EVIDENT SOVIET DETERMINATION TO REINFORCE
CAPABILITIES TO FIGHT AND WIN A SHORT CONVENTIONAL WAR
IN EUROPE. THEY WILL ALSO BE TROUBLED BY THE GRADUAL
INCREASES IN THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES ON THE
SEA FLANKS OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE THREATS TO WESTERN
LIFE-LINES POSED BY INCREASING PROJECTS OF SOVIET
NAVAL POWER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

HOW THE ALLIES ACCOMMODATE TO SOVIET PRESSURES
WILL BE A TEST OF THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE MAINTENANCE
OF THE BALANCE.

WHILE WE ANTICIPATE CONTINUED CAUTION TOWARDS THE
USSR AND POSSIBLY EVEN SOME ACCOMMODATION TO SOVIET PRES-

SURES, PARTICULARLY BY THE FLANK COUNTRIES, WE DO NOT FORESEE ANY SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS FROM THE BEHAVIOR THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED ALLIED APPROACHES TO THE SOVIETS IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. THUS, WE DOUBT THAT INCREASED CONCERN OVER THEIMPLICATIONS OF GROWING SOVIET MILITARY POWER WILL BE TRANSLATED INTO ANY NEW DETERMINATION TO FACE UP TO THE COSTS OF DEFENSE NECESSITATED BY THIS GROWTH. THE RESPONSE OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE LIMITED BY WELFARE STATE DEMANDS AND BY THE LACK OF FIRM POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR ADDITIONAL DEFENSE SPENDING.
IT IS WORTH RECALLING, HERE, THAT FOLLOWING A

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 03 OF 12 310344Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310417Z 077132 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2542
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 03 OF 12 310344Z

SECRET SECTION 3 OF 12 USNATO 1833

PERIOD OF GRADUALLY RISING DEFENSE SPENDING FROM 1970-1975, MOST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REVERSED COURSE AND, PARTIALLY IN RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC STRAINS, HAVE RELAXED THEIR DEFENSE EFFORTS. INDEED, THE PREDOMINANCE OF ECONOMIC AND INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEFENSE BUDGET DECISIONS HAS NOT WANED WITH EUROPE'S PARTIAL RECOVERY FROM THE RECESSION OF 1974-1975, AND MAY BE INCREASING. IN BRIEF, WE EXPECT A TOUGH STRUGGLE EVEN TO MAINTAIN EXISTING REAL LEVELS OF DEFENSE SPENDING.

THE BALANCE IN EUROPE WILL BE AFFECTED NOT ONLY BY THE STABILITY OF EASTERN EUROPE, BUT ALSO BY DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE ISSUES OF GREATEST MOMENT FOR US ARE LIKELY TO BE, NOT THE NARROW MILITARY BALANCE, WHICH CAN BE BRACED BY US DETERMINATION, BUT RATHER THE BROADER POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CURRENTS THAT ARE MUCH LESS AMENABLE TO US INFLUENCE.

PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN SOUTHERN EUROPE MAY BE DRAMATIC. DIVISIVE CHALLENGES TO ALLIED UNITY COULD DERIVE FROM POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE AND ITALY, THE GREEK -TURKISH DISPUTE, AND THE CONTINUING WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SICKNESS. THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY WELL LEAD TOWARD: INCREASED MANEUVERING AMONG ALLIES AT NATO, AS THEY SEEK TO MANIPULATE THEIR NATO ROLES FOR TACTICAL AND POLITICAL GAINS; A TENDENCY TOWARD MORE SELECTIVE PARTICIPATION THAT MAY POSE PROBLEMS FOR ALLIED SOLIDARITY; AND GROWING DISPARITIES IN ALLIED ABILITIES TO SHARE THE BURDENS OF DEFENSE, AS WELL AS IN THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF THE PURPOSE OF DEFENSE.

TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES, FORCEFUL LEADERSHIP WILL BE ESSENTIAL. AS AN ALLIANCE, LACKING ANY SUPERNATIONAL SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 03 OF 12 310344Z

AUTHORITY, NATO HAS ALWAYS RELIED ON US INITIATIVE AND LEADERSHIP IN MATTERS OF DEFENSE AND IN ALLIED RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. IN COMING YEARS OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE SUSTAINED AND INGENIOUS LEADERSHIP, AND TO FORGE A CONSENSUS ON MAJOR ISSUES THROUGH PATIENT DIDACTIC MEASURES WILL DETERMINE THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO SERVE COMMON INTERESTS.

III. OBJECTIVES, ISSUES, AND COURSES OF ACTION
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE TWO PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES TO US POLICY WILL BE::

-- FIRST, TO MAXIMIZE THOSE ACTIVITIES
THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE COHESIVENESS AND
SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENT
AMONG SOVEREIGN STATES. NATO, OF COURSE, REFLECTS AND
CANNOT CONTROL THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS THAT,
ULTIMATELY, SHAPE ALLIED VIEWS TOWARD THE TREATY
ORGANIZATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE US IN COMING YEARS MUST
ATTEMPT THROUGH MANAGEMENT, CONSULTATION, AND LEADER-
SHIP TO CREATE MAXIMUM INCENTIVES TO FULL PARTICIPATION
BY ALL ALLIES.

--SECOND, TO WORK WITHIN EXISTING ALLIED FINANCIAL
RESOURCES, AT BEST marginally INCREASED, IN ATTEMPTING
TO PREVENT A FURTHER EROSION OF THE EAST-WEST CON-
VENTIONAL MILITARY BALANCE, WHILE ACHIEVING A MORE
RATIONAL THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE.

A. HOW WE CONSULT WITH EUROPE AND THE ALLIES
ON SOME TRANS-ATLANTIC ISSUES, THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER TO CONSULT WITH ALLIES AT NATO, BILATERALLY OR
IN OTHER "INNER GROUP" MEETINGS, OR DIRECTLY WITH THE
NINE, WILL POSE DELICATE CHOICES FOR THE US, PARTICULARLY
WHEN CONFLICTING EUROPEAN VIEWS ON CONSULTATIONS NEED
TO BE RECONCILED AND WHEN SMALLER ALLIES FEEL LEFT OUT.

WE ANTICIPATE CONTINUED PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA AT
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 03 OF 12 310344Z

NATO AS THE MOMENTUM OF EC CONSULTATIONS ON EAST-WEST
ISSUES DEVELOPS, AND IF THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO AFFIRM
RESTRICTIONS ON CONSULTATIONS AT NATO AND SEEK TO PRO-
MOTE A DIRECTORATE BOTH WITHIN THE EC AND AMONG
MAJOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE US. THE BRITISH, AND
MORE PARTICULARLY THE GERMANS, WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT
CONSULTATIONS AT NATO. THE GERMANS, IN PARTICULAR,
WILL SHOW THEMSELVES TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE NEED TO BE
SEEN AS PARTICIPATING WITH ALL NATO ALLIES IN CONSUL-
TATIONS, RATHER THAN SEEKING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE UNITED STATES.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 04 OF 12 310347Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W

-----310417Z 077237 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2543
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 04 OF 12 310347Z

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 12 USNATO 1833

WHILE OVERALL PRESCRIPTIONS CANNOT PROVIDE GUIDELINES, WE SHOULD TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE:
--AVOID AN "INNER DIRECTORATE" FOR MAJOR ISSUES AMONG THE ALLIES AT NATO;
--REMAIN SENSITIVE TO SMALLER ALLIES' CONCERNS ABOUT BEING LEFT OUT AND, WHEN "INNER GROUP" CONSULTATIONS TAKE PLACE, AND TRY TO SUPPLEMENT THEM WITH DISCUSSIONS AT NATO;
-- BE ALERT TO THE IMPACT THAT OUR AD HOC DECISIONS CONSULTATIONS MAY HAVE ON THE EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR EC AND NATO ALLIES.

2) EAST- WEST RELATIONS AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

THROUGH A SUSTAINED CONCEPTUAL AND CONSULTATIVE EFFORT DURING THE PERIOD THAT WITNESSED THE LAUNCHING OF SALT, MBFR, CSCE, OSTPOLITIK AND THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES HAD DEVELOPED BY THE MID-SEVENTIES A BROAD CONFIDENCE IN THE US APPROACH TO ONGOING EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSENSUS ON THEIR

IMPLICATIONS. THE ADVENT OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, HOWEVER, AND ITS VIGOROUS AFFIRMATION OF NEW CONCEPTS AND PROPOSALS, INEVITABLE RAISES NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DIRECTIONS OF WESTERN POLICY DESIRED BY THE US. THE CURRENT DOUBTS IN EUROPE TESTIFY TO THE CENTRALITY OF THE US LEAD IN SETTING THE INTELLECTUAL TERMS IN WHICH EAST-WEST PROBLEMS ARE VIEWED.

NOW, THE ALLIES ARE STIMULATED, AND MILDLY TROUBLED, BY THE PRESIDENT'S FORCEFUL ASSERTION OF A NEW PRIMACY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMS CONTROL, AND BY HIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS THAT CAN IMPACT DIRECTLY ON ALLIED SECURITY. THE CURRENT UNCERTAINTY IS, WE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 04 OF 12 310347Z

BELIEVE, NATURAL AND HEALTHY SINCE THE ALLIES CAN, AT THIS STAGE, TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE CONTENT AND DIRECTION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

WITH THE VISITS OF ALLIED LEADERS TO WASHINGTON, AND THE EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS THE SECRETARY AND OTHERS ARE UNDERTAKING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, THE ALLIES ARE BEGINNING TO ASSIMILATE AND TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF WASHINGTON'S AGENDA FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE EXPECT THAT WITH NATO AND ECONOMIC SUMMITS AND OTHER CONTACTS BETWEEN EUROPEAN LEADERS AND THE US ADMINISTRATION, THE ALLIES WILL, OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, BECOME INCREASINGLY AT EASE WITH NEW US POLICIES AND PERSONALITIES AND WITH THE PROGRAM FOR EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE FORESEE.

--FOR THE US, WE BELIEVE, THE CHALLENGE IN THIS PERIOD WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT THE ALLIES UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT US OBJECTIVES AND SHARE THE RATIONALE ON WHICH THEY ARE BASED. WE WILL SEEK TO SUPPORT THIS PROCESS BY HIGHLIGHTING ALLIED CONCERNS, AND BY SUGGESTING WAYS TO MEET THEM THROUGH CONSULTATIONS.

SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT ARISE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES ARE:

A. THE NATURE OF THE ADVERSARY: THE ALLIES HAVE ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF THE USSR AS AN EMERGING GLOBAL POWER, BENT ON AMASSING MILITARY FORCE, THAT COULD BE INDUCED THROUGH ALLIED STRENGTH AND A WEB OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS TO MODERATE ITS AGGRESSIVITY IN ITS OWN INTEREST. BUT THEY NOW ARE ASKING, IN ESSENCE, FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S NET JUDGMENT, BASED ON THE BEST CURRENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ESTIMATES, ABOUT THE BASIC NATURE OF THE USSR, SOVIET ASPIRATIONS, THE WAY THE SOVIETS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVES WE
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 04 OF 12 310347Z

ARE PUTTING FORWARD, AND HOW OUR PROPOSALS FIT INTO A PROGRAM TO INFLUENCE SOVIET BEHAVIOR. ABOVE ALL, A CONSENSUS ON THE NATURE OF THE ADVERSARY IS CENTRAL TO NATO'S COHERENCE; IT DOES NOT EXIST, EFFECTIVE MILITARY AND POLICY PLANNING ARE IMPOSSIBLE.

-- ALL THIS NEEDS TO BE ARTICULATED AND DISCUSSED WITH THE ALLIES-- WHO WILL HAVE THEIR OWN IDEAS AND EXPERIENCE TO ADD TO OURS.

B. HUMAN RIGHTS; OUR AFFIRMATION OF THE PRIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN POLICY IS BOTH WELCOMED AND QUESTIONED BY THE ALLIES. THEY DO NOT KNOW YET WHERE OUR APPROACH WILL LEAD AND THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT, SOMEHOW, IT MAY YET BACKFIRE.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 05 OF 12 310350Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310418Z 077294 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2544
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE

CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 05 OF 12 310350Z

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 12 USNATO 1833

FROM A NATO PERSPECTIVE, A FEW OBSERVATIONS:
--FIRST, WE BELIEVE A VIGOROUS ASSERTION OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAN HELP SENSITIZE A BROAD
RANGE OF EUROPEAN OPINION, LEFT AND RIGHT, TO THE REAL
STAKES IN THE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF THE WEST, AND THUS,
ULTIMATELY, TO THE IMPORTANCE OF SOME SACRIFICE TO
DEFEND THE PLURALISTIC WESTERN SYSTEM.
--SECOND, WE SEE IMPLICIT IN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS
EFFORTS A RECOGNITION THAT DETENTE -- REAL DETENTE
WITH THE USSR WILL DEPEND ULTIMATELY ON CHANGING THE
NATURE OF OUR ADVERSARY, SO THAT THE RESTRAINTS ON
AGGRESSIVITY ARE NOT MERELY EXTERNAL. PENDING SUCH A
SEA CHANGE, EFFECTIVE DEFENSE ARE ESSENTIAL.
--IN ANY EVENT, WE SHOULD NOT BE DETERRED BY
THE AMBIVALENT VIEWS OF SOME ALLIES, WHO WILL
GRADUALLY ACCEPT OUR APPROACHES AS WE CONTINUE TO
HIGHLIGHT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

C. NEW US ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS: THE ALLIES
HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL APPROACHES
TO THE SOVIETS, PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED, REGARDING DEMILI-
TARIZATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN, NON-ARMING OF SATEL-
)853 -, \$ NON-DESTRUCTION OF OBSERVATION SATELLITES,
AND PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF MISSILE TEST LAUNCHES.
THEY HAVE NOTED AS WELL REFERENCES TO STUDIES OF
POSSIBLE NAVAL LIMITATIONS. THESE PROPOSALS IMPACT
ON ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS.
--WE MUST CONTINUE CONSULTING WITH THE ALLIES
ON THESE ISSUES, IN THE PROCESS NOW BEGUN.

D. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS AND NON-PROLIFERATION:
CONSULTATIONS AT NATO CAN CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S OBJECTIVES IN THESE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 05 OF 12 310350Z

AREAS. THUS, WHILE WE CAN AFFIRM OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES
AS APPROPRIATE IN NATO FORA AND REVIEW PROGRESS IN
DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MEETINGS, THE PRINCIPAL EFFORT WITH
ALLIES SHOULD BE PURSUED THROUGH "INNER GROUP" CONSUL-
TATIONS OUTSIDE THE NATO FRAMEWORK.

3) ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS

A. CSCE: THE QUALITY OF US CONTRIBUTIONS AND OF NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF WORK HAVE KEPT THE FOCUS ON ALLIED PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE AT NATO. COORDINATION WITH THE NINE -DESPITE SOME DIFFERENCES OF PACE-- HAS GENERALLY BEEN SMOOTH. THE PROCESS UNDERWAY PROMISES TO TAKE THE ALLIES TO BELGRADE, NOT WITH A JOINT POSITION, BUT WITH A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES AND OF COMMON ALLIED OBJECTIVES.

THE LOCUS OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS WILL TEND TO SHIFT TO BELGRADE DURING THE CONFERENCE, WITH SOME WORK CONTINUING AT NATO, ON ISSUES SUCH AS CBM IMPLEMENTATION. IN THE POST-BELGRADE PERIOD, POSTULATING A FURTHER REVIEW CONFERENCE OR, AT LEAST, SUSTAINED INTEREST IN IMPLEMENTATION, CONSULTATIONS SHOULD RESUME SMOOTHLY AT NATO AND AMONG THE NINE. --POST-BELGRADE, WE SHOULD TRY TO EASE INTO CONTINUED NATO CONSULTATION, WITHOUT POSING THE ISSUE OF A MANDATE.

B. SALT: OUR RECORD OF CONSULTATIONS ON SALT IS EXCELLENT. WE CAN KEEP IT THAT WAY BY: TIMELINESS; SENSITIVITY TO ALLIED CONCERNS ON NON-TRANSFER, NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND FBS; AND BY CONSULTING EVEN WHEN THE DEMANDS OF NEGOTIATIONS ABSORB OUR ATTENTION. WITH RECENT BRIEFINGS;, WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK.

LOOKING AHEAD, THE ALLIES WILL BE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE HANDLING OF "GREY AREAS" IN SALT II; HOW SALT II AND SALT II MAY IMPACT ON THE REGIONAL BALANCE
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 05 OF 12 310350Z

AND THREAT, CRUISE MISSILES, AND MBFR.

--WE SHOULD DAMPEN EUROPEAN SPECULATION, WHICH MAY BEGIN TO PERCOLATE AS SALT II MOVES AHEAD, AND SHARE WITH THE ALLIES AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

C. MBFR: ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS LEADING TO A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, ARE THE DESIRED ALLIED OBJECTIVES, HARDENED FOR SOME INTO TABLETS OF STONE BY EIGHT YEARS OF MBFR STUDIES AND CONSULTATIONS. THE TABLING OF EASTERN DATA ASSERTING THAT THERE IS NO GROUND FORCE

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 06 OF 12 310350Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W

-----310419Z 077314 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2545
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 06 OF 12 310350Z

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 12 USNATO 1833

DISPARITY INCREASINGLY MAY BRING INTO QUESTION THE
ATTAINMENT OF EXISTING ALLIED OBJECTIVES.

LOOKING AHEAD, AFTER THE DATA DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST
HAS RUN ITS COURSE, AND ITS RESULTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED,
THE US WILL BE FACED WITH THE DECISION WHETHER (A) TO
CONTINUE TO PRESS THE PRESENT POSITION, IN THE FACE OF
THE PROBABLE CONTINUING EASTERN ATTACK ON THE SIZE OF
ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS SOUGHT BY THE ALLIES; OR (B) TO
PROPOSE TO THE ALLIES SOME MODIFICATIONS OF THE ALLIED
POSITION. THE ALLIES MAY EVENTUALLY BE WILLING TO CON-
SIDER NEW PROPOSALS WHICH OFFERED THE PROSPECT OF MOVING

THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A SOUND OUTCOME. ALTHOUGH THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WILL REMAIN THE CORNERSTONE OF THE ALLIANCE MBFR POSITION, WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MEASURES SUCH AS A CHANGE IN THE FORM OF PHASE I WITHDRAWALS AND PROVIDING A FIRMER COMMITMENT TO THE EAST ON THE FORM AND TIMING OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, AT PRESENT, THERE IS A SENSE AMONG ALLIES (A) THAT THE NEXT MAJOR MOVE IN MBFR, IN RETURN FOR OPTION III, SHOULD BE UP TO THE EAST; AND (B) THAT THE EAST IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE THAT MOVE UNTIL COMPLETION OF A SALT II AGREEMENT.

ALLIED-FRENCH DISAGREEMENTS ON MBFR POLICY SHOULD BE DAMPENED WHERE POSSIBLE; HOWEVER, THE FRENCH MAY ASSERT THEIR OBJECTIONS MORE VIGOROUSLY IF THERE ARE SIGNS OF REAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

OUR ONLY CURRENT PRESCRIPTION IS FOR THE MOST INTENSE AND THOROUGH CONSULTATIONS ON ANY NEW PROPOSALS IN AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE SOLIDARITY THAT HAS CONSISTENTLY CHARACTERIZED THE ALLIED
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 06 OF 12 310350Z

APPROACH AND ACTIVITIES ON THIS ISSUE.

4) ECONOMIC ISSUES

WE NEED TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE NATO CONSULTATIONS ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THE POSSIBLE UTILITY OF HOLDING DISCUSSIONS IN NATO ON THE ISSUE OF WESTERN CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF FURTHER OECD EFFORTS IN THIS AREA.

5) REGIONAL ISSUES

A. THE SOUTHERN REGION:

(1) POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE AND ITALY. THERE HAS BEEN NO ANTICIPATORY PLANNING AT NATO REGARDING SECURITY OR OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN ITALY OR FRANCE. SUCH PLANNING IS, IN FACT, INFEASIBLE, AND WE HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED IT BECAUSE OF THE OBVIOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT OF LIKELY LEAKS.

NEVERTHELESS, AS OUR EXPERIENCE WITH WEU PARLIAMENTARIANS HAS DEMONSTRATED, THE PROBLEMS FOR NATO OF DEALING WITH COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN ALLIED GOVERNMENT S WELL MAY BECOME MORE ACUTE OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH THE NATO STRUCTURE CAN BE ADAPTED TO HANDLING PARTIAL PARTICIPATION (FRANCE, GREECE AND, FOR A TIME, PORTUGAL), SUCH ADJUSTMENTS DISRUPT NATO

WORK AND WOULD BE FORMIDABLE IN THE EVENT OF
SERIOUS SECURITY RISKS INVOLVING A MAJOR ALLY.

THE ALLIES WILL LOOK TO THE US TO PROPOSE

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 07 OF 12 310352Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310420Z 077356 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2546
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 07 OF 12 310352Z

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 12 USNATO 1833

STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS, IF EVER WE DEEM THEM NECESSARY,
BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF AN ALLIED GOVERN-

MENT. HOWEVER, ANY SUCH DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN AT A HIGH LEVEL. WE WILL SEEK TO INSURE THAT NO ANTICIPATORY ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AT NATO PREEMPT OR COMPLICATE WASHINGTON'S DECISIONS IN THIS AREA.

(2) FRANCE:

GIVEN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND PROSPECTS, OUR EFFORTS, WE BELIEVE, SHOULD BE LIMITED TO PRAGMATIC STEPS TO: (A) ACCOMMODATE UNPUBLICIZED FRENCH COOPERATION WITH NATO IN THE MILITARY SPHERE, AND (B) TO ACHIEVE PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF CONSULTATIONS. WE SHALL SEEK INSTRUCTIONS ON ANY POINTS WHERE WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD STAND UP TO FRANCE.

(3) SPAIN:

BILATERAL TIES BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE ALLIES HAVE PROGRESSED SATISFACTORILY OVER THE PAST YEAR AND EFFORTS TO STIMULATE SPAIN-NATO CONTACTS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON SPAIN'S PART OF RAMIFICATIONS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP.

WE JUDGE THAT THE QUESTION OF SPAIN'S ACCESSION TO NATO MEMBERSHIP WILL BE DISCUSSED MORE ACTIVELY IN SPAIN AND BY ALLIES FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS, AND THAT MIXED VIEWS PERSIST IN BOTH SPANISH MILITARY AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

WE SEE OUR ROLE AS ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN A SENSE OF MOMENTUM THROUGH THE PROGRAM WE HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST YEAR WITH EMBASSY MADRID -- WHILE AVOIDING ACTIONS OR STATEMENTS THAT COULD LEAD THE SPANISH TO
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 07 OF 12 310352Z

FEEL THAT THEY ARE BEING PRESSURED TO TAKE FINAL STEPS TOWARD NATO MEMBERSHIP BEFORE THEY ARE READY.

(4) PORTUGAL:

US AND ALLIED ASSISTANCE TO THE BRIGADE REGAINS A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE PORTUGUESE FORCES WITH THE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH A RATIONAL NATO-RELATED ROLE.

(5) GREECE AND TURKEY:

GREECE AND TURKEY WILL CONTINUE TO MANEUVER AGAINST ONE ANOTHER AT NATO UNLESS BASIC DISPUTES BETWEEN THESE TWO ALLIES ARE ATTENUATED.

THE TURKS HAVE BEEN TAKING A TOUGHER STANCE IN RECENT MONTHS ON BENEFITS TO GREECE FROM ITS SELECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN NATO ACTIVITIES. THEY HAVE EVEN DELAYED AND COMPLICATED NATO PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO THWART THE GREEKS. WE EXPECT SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE.

GREECE-NATO NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOW ENTERING A SECOND PHASE, WHERE SOME PROGRESS MAY BE POSSIBLE THROUGH TECHNICAL MILITARY DISCUSSIONS OF PRACTICAL ISSUES.

AT NATO, WE WILL AIM TO DAMPEN CONTENTION BETWEEN THESE TWO ALLIES AND TO PROMOTE PROGRAMS ON THE SMALL STEPS THAT MAY BE POSSIBLE PENDING RESOLUTION OF BROADER GREECE-TURKEY-US PROBLEMS

B. THE CENTRAL REGION:

THE FRG'S POSTURE AT NATO CONTINUES TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY MEASURE, MODERATION, A DESIRE GENERALLY TO BE IN STEP WITH THE ALLIES -- AND, RECENTLY, SOME ASSERTION OF THE WEIGHT TO WHICH ITS INCREASING RELATIVE POWER ENTITLES IT. PRESENT "STRAINS" IN FRG-US TIES OVER SUCH ISSUES AS THE AWACS/TANK TRADEOFFS HAVE NOT AFFECTED CLOSE COOPERATION AT NATO.
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 07 OF 12 310352Z

LOOKING AHEAD, WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE INCREASING PREPONDERANCE OF FRG ECONOMIC AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY POWER WILL NEED TO BE ACCOMMODATED, GRADUALLY, IN THE NATO COMMAND AND SECRETARIAT STRUCTURE. WHILE THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE OF GERMAN THRUST IN THIS DIRECTION, THE FRG APPEARS KEENLY ENSITIVE TO THE NEED TO AVOID ANY SEMBLANCE OF A SPECIAL WASHINGTON-BONN RELATIONSHIP OR OF ACTION THAT COULD ALIENATE THE FRG FROM THE WEAKER ALLIES.

C. THE NORTHERN REGION:

GIVEN THE LIMITATIONS OF NATO'S ABILITY TO DEPLOY SUBSTANTIAL POWER IN THE NORTHERN REGION, AND THE SENSITIVITY OF OUR SCANDINAVIAN ALLIES TO SOVIET

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 08 OF 12 310351Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310421Z 077340 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2547
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 08 OF 12 310351Z

S E C R E T SECTION 8 OF 12 USNATO 1833

PRESSURES WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO
BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN DEMONSTRATE
THROUGH VISITS, EXERCISES, AND OTHER GESTURES, NATO'S
CONTINUE INTEREST IN THE NORTHERN REGION.

B. PREVENTING FURTHER EROSION OF THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY
BALANCE

1) GENERAL.

IN COMING MONTHS ALLIED CAPITALS WILL NOT
LACK FOR SUGGESTION FOR FORCE IMPROVEMENTS
CARRYING THE NATO CACHET, E.G., FORCE GOALS,
FLEXIBILITY REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, SACEUR'S
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, NATO AIRBORNE EARLY
WARNING (AEW), INFRASTRUCTURE AUGMENTATION, AND
THE WELTER OF ACTIVITIES, REPORTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ASSOCIATED UNDER THE GENERAL RUBRIC OF
"COOPERATIVE DEFENSE EFFORTS." ALL ARE BASICALLY
CONSONANT WITH THE LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT,
WHICH THE US SUCCEEDED IN INCORPORATING INTO 1975
MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE AND WHICH WE EXPECT TO SEE
REAFFIRMED IN THE FORTHCOMING 1977 GUIDANCE.
RESULTS ACHIEVED SO FAR WITHIN THE LONG-RANGE
DEFENSE CONCEPT HAVE NOT PREVENTED A WIDENING OF
THE GAP BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NATO CONVENTIONAL

CAPABILITIES. THE IMMEDIATE CHALLENGE IS THUS FOR BETTER RESULTS WITHIN THE AGREED CONCEPT. WE BELIEVE THAT NATO CAN PURSUE ANY SPECIFICALLY NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN THE AGREED GENERAL NATO STRATEGY, WHICH IS, BY DEFINITION, FLEXIBLE. THE AGREED STRATEGY PROVIDES A SOUND KEYSTONE FOR THE ALLIANCE; AS LONG AS THAT KEYSTONE IS IN PLACE, MUCH DEBATE AND EVEN CONTROVERSY AS TO
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 08 OF 12 310351Z

WHAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE DOING TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGY CAN BE CONSTRUCTIVELY ACCOMMODATED. WASHINGTON' LEADERSHIP ROLE WILL BE CENTRAL TO THE DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES FOR IMPROVEMENTS AND OF GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PHASING. WE BELIEVE THAT PROPOSALS HAMMERED OUT IN NATO FORA ARE VALID INDIVIDUALLY, BUT THAT COLLECTIVELY THEY FORM AN AMORPHOUS MASS IN WHICH INTERACTIONS ARE UNCLEAR. YET, IMPERFECT AS NATO MACHINERY IS, ALL OF THESE PROPOSALS ARE PRESENTLY BEING MONITORED AND NATO IS MAKING SOME PROGRESS ON THEM.

THE ALLIES CAN BE LED TO GREATER EFFORT BY TYING CERTAIN US UNILATERAL IMPROVEMENTS TO APPROPRIATE, COMPLEMENTARY ALLIED ACTIONS. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE CONSONANT WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S STATEMENT TO THE NAC THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER DOING MORE FOR NATO IF THE ALLIES ALSO DO MORE.

WE THUS RECOMMEND THAT:
--WHENEVER THE US IS READY TO UNVEIL INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVING US NATO FORCES, WASHINGTON DECIDE THE TYPE AND LEVEL OF RESPONSE THE US WANTS FROM ITS ALLIES. THE US SHOULD PURSUE ITS OBJECTIVES FOR ALLIED FORCE IMPROVEMENTS IN CAPITALS AS WELL AS IN NATO HEADQUARTERS.

2) READINESS:

A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE FOR NATO WILL BE TO INCREASE THE READINESS OF FRONT LINE FORCES TO COPE WITH WHAT SACEUR CALLS A/COMPRESSION OF OUR WARNING CUSHION." THE TASK IS TO CAPITALIZE ON THE INTEREST AND CONCERN STIMULATED BY RECENT CRITICS, SUCH AS NUNN AND CLOSE, WHILE BASING THE NEED FOR IMPROVED READINESS ON A BROAD APPRECIATION OF THE DANGERS OF REDUCED WARNING TIME RATHER THAN ONLY ON THE HEIGHTENED DANGER OF
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 08 OF 12 310351Z

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 09 OF 12 310353Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310422Z 077389 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2548
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 09 OF 12 310353Z

S E C R E T SECTION 9 OF 12 USNATO 1833

UNREINFORCED ATTACK.
THE ALLIES ARE MORE LIKELY TO RESPOND
PRODUCTIVELY TO A CALL FOR INCREASED READINESS
COUCHED IN THESE TERMS THAN TO AN APPEAL BASED
SOLELY ON THE HEIGHTENED PROSPECTS OF UNREINFORCED
ATTACK. THEY HAVE THEMSELVES ALWAYS
HIGHLIGHTED THE DANGER OF UNREINFORCED ATTACK SO
AS TO SUGGEST THAT QUICK ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WOULD BE NECESSARY, THUS UNDERMINING THE

RATIONALE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO OVERTURN THE ESTABLISHED AND SENSIBLE US POSITION THAT NATO MUST BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH

A VARIETY OF CONTINGENCIES, VARYING FROM SURPRISE TO FULLY REINFORCED ATTACK.

EFFORTS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH AND READINESS. BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE:

- A. TO BUILD UP FIRE POWER AND STOCKS OF EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS, AND TO IDENTIFY RESUPPLY SOURCES AND METHODS -- ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE INCREASED USAGE RATES DERIVED FROM THE YOM KIPPUR WAR;
- B. TO IMPROVE POSITIONING, AIRLIFT

CAPABILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, AND CONTROL; AND

C. TO ENHANCE THE COMPATIBILITY OF ARMAMENTS, DOCTRINE, AND TACTICS.

IN SPURRING THE ALLIES TO INCREASE READINESS, THE US SHOULD:

--BASE PROPOSALS ON A BROAD APPRECIATION OF THE DANGERS OF REDUCED WARNING TIME; AND
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 09 OF 12 310353Z

--PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE DIRECTED AT IMPROVING NATO'S CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE AGREED STRATEGY.

3) REINFORCEMENT AND ALLIED RESERVE AND MILITIA FORCES.

IT IS ABSURD TO HOLD THAT EUROPE'S DEFENSE FROM THE VERY START OF HOSTILITIES DEPENDS CRITICALLY ON REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES, WHEN REINFORCEMENTS IN THE FORM OF TRAINED EUROPEAN RESERVES, OVER A MILLION STRONG, OUGHT TO BE DEPLOYABLE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AS ORGANIZED, TRAINED, AND EQUIPPED UNITS, IN SUPPORT OF THE STANDING FORCES OF NATO. IN FACT, EUROPEAN RESERVE FORCES CONSTITUTE A LARGE POTENTIAL RESOURCE THAT, IF PROPERLY USED, COULD ADD MATERIALLY TO NATO DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE, AND MIGHT PROVIDE A HEDGE AGAINST POSSIBLE MBFR REDUCTIONS. THE WHOLE AREA OF REINFORCEMENTS AND RESERVES HAS BEEN TOO LONG INSULATED FROM COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS. WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN MODEST INVESTMENT IS LIKELY TO YIELD HIGH RETURNS, AND WE WELCOME SHAPE'S INITIATIVE IN LAUNCHING A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF RESERVE AND MOBILIZATION FORCES, REINFORCEMENTS, RECEPTION FACILITIES, AND ONWARD MOVEMENTS.

ESISTING PROBLEMS WITH EUROPEAN RESERVE
FORCES STEM FROM INADEQUATE TRAINING, EQUIPMENT,
AND CONCEPTS FOR EMPLOYING AVAILABLE MANPOWER TO
THE FULLEST. IT SEEMS OBVIOUS THAT THE EUROPEANS
WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE MORE POTENTIAL RESERVISTS
THAT THEY CAN ACCOMMODATE WITHIN ESITING RESERVE
FORCE STRUCTURES. (THE FRG, WITH ITS TERRITORIAL
ARMY, IS A PARTIAL EXCEPTION TO THIS GENERAL
OBSERVATION.) WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IN
SEVERAL NATIONS THE CREATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 09 OF 12 310353Z

CAPITALIZING ON THEIR MEMBERS' KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL
TERRAIN AND CONDITIONS (ALONG THE LINES OF THE
SWISS MODEL) MIGHT MATERIALLY ADD DEPTH TO NATO'S
DEFENSES AND STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE. IN OUR VIEW,
TRAINED RESERVES AND LOCAL MILITIA COULD MAKE A

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 10 OF 12 310354Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310424Z 077424 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2549
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE

CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 10 OF 12 310354Z

S E C R E T SECTION 10 OF 12 USNATO 1833

PARTICULAR CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE IN DEPTH IN
THE FOLLOWING AREAS: (A) DEFENSE OF BUILT-UP
AREAS; (B) SPECIALIZED BARRIER DEFENSE PROCES;
AND (C) THICKENED ANTI-ARMOR DEFENSES.

EVEN IF INDEPENDENT NATIONAL RESERVE
FORCES AND PLANS ARE IMPROVED, THEY ARE NOT
LIKELY TO DOVETAIL--UNLESS NEW EFFORTS ARE
UNDERTAKEN--WITH PLANS, CAPABILITIES, AND NEEDS
OF EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENT FORCES COMING FROM THE
UNITED STATES, CANADA AND THE UK. A COHERENT,
VIABLE DEFENSE WILL DEPEND ON SPURRING ALLIES
TO ACCEPT THAT REAR AREA AND TERRITORIAL
DEFENSE DO NOT FALL WITHIN THEIR EXCLUSIVE
COMPETENCE.

ACCORDINGLY, WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING
SPECIFIC ACTIONS:

--AS THE US INCREASES THE READINESS OF
ITS REINFORCEMENT FORCES, URGE THE ALLIES TO
IMPROVE THEIR RESERVE AND MILITIA FORCES. SUCH
EFFORTS COULD INCLUDE THE EXAMINATION OF (A)
EXISTING MANPOWER PROGRAMS, (B) EMPLOYMENT OF
TRAINED RESERVES IN THE TIMELY SUPPORT OF STANDING
FORCES, (C) THE CONTRIBUTION THAT TRAINED
RESERVES AND LOCAL MILITIA COULD MAKE TO A
STRENGTHENED DEFENSE IN DEPTH.

--AS THE US TAKES STEPS TO SPEED UP THE
ARRIVAL OF ITS REINFORCEMENT FORCES, TIE THESE
MEASURES TO AN ALLIED UNDERTAKING TO PROVIDE
ASSURED SUPPORT FOR RECEPTION AND ONWARD
MOVEMENT FOR US FORCES AT SEAPORTS AND AIRPORTS
AND TO EXPEDITE THEIR MOVEMENT TO THE FORWARD
AREA.

--SUPPORT THE SHAPE STUDY OF RESERVE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 10 OF 12 310354Z

FORCES, LINKING AN ENHANCED US CONTRIBUTION
(REINFORCEMENT) TO A COMPLEMENTARY ALLIED
RESPONSE.

--SUPPORT SACEUR'S RECOMMENDATION FOR

FORWARD DEPLOYMENT BY NATIONS(PARTICULARLY THE NETHERLANDS) THAT CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO NORTHAG IN ORDER TO PARALLEXDEPLOYMENT OF THE USNORHTAG BRIGADE.

4) COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS.

ACHIEVING FULL EFFECTIVENESS OF IN-PLACE, REINFORCEMENT, AND RESERVE FORCES DEMANDS LARGE IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO'S COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE. SACEUR HAS ASSIGNED TOP PRIORITY TO IMPROVING THE C3 STRUCTURES; ONGOING PROGRAMS, HOWEVER, ARE BUT A START TOWARD THE CAPABILITY NATO REQUIRES TO ACHIEVE THE "FORCE MULTIPLIER" WHICH A COMPREHENSIVE AND RESPONSIVE C3 SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE.

--THE US AND ITS ALLIES SHOULD DEDICATE THEMSELVES TO ACHIEVING COMPLEMENTARY NATIONAL-NATO C3 SYSTEMS SERVING THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE, AND SHOULD CAPITALIZE ON ALL AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY TO PROVIDE COMMANDERS WITH THE TOOLS WHICH CAN SORT AND PRESENT UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY AND HOSTILE FORCES.

5) SPURRING COMPATIBILITY OF FORCES.

DESPITE PAST EFFORTS, THE ATMOSPHERE FOR SOLID PROGRESS IN INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION AT PRESENT IS NOT GOOD.

CHARGES THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE BEING SHORT CHANGED ON F-16 COPRODUCTION, DISILLUSIONMENT ABOUT THE US-FRG TANK AGREEMENT, SPECULATION THAT NATO AEW IS SIMPLY ANOTHER "BUY AMERICAN"

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 10 OF 12 310354Z

SCHEME, MISINFORMATION THAT THE US IS "AMERICANIZING ROLAND," AND REVERBERATIONS OVER CONCORDE LANDING RIGHTS WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO GO TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS FOR FUNDS TO PURCHASE AMERICAN SYSTEMS,

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 11 OF 12 310354Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W

-----310425Z 077419 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77

FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2550
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 11 OF 12 310354Z

S E C R E T SECTION 11 OF 12 USNATO 1833

REGARDLESS OF COMPELLING MILITARY NEED.

POSITIVE ELEMENTS INCLUDE:

A. SOME PROGRESS, THROUGH A NATO AD HOC COMMITTEE ON EQUIPMENT INTEROPERABILITY, IN SPOTLIGHTING IMPEDIMENTS TO INTEROPERABILITY AND IN WORKING ON PROCEDURES TO INSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF FUTURE EQUIPMENT;

B. US CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO AUTHORIZE SECDEF, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, TO WAIVE THE REQUIREMENT TO RECOUP FULL R&D CHARGES AND FMS FEES.

HOWEVER, COOPERATIVE EFFORT ON TIMELY ARMAMENTS PLANING HAS ONLY BEGUN.

IN THIS SITUATION, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON PRACTICAL EFFORTS TO:

--MESH THE PROGRAMMING ASPECTS OF ARMAMENTS AND LOGISTICS PLANNING (HOW ALLIES CAN ACQUIRE WEAPONS) WITH FORCE PLANNING (HOW MANY WEAPONS THE ALLIES NEED, AND THEIR BROAD

CHARACTERISTICS). AS WITH THE NATO F-16 PROGRAM, THE PAYOFF WOULD BE EARLY STATEMENTS OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND TIMELY PROVISION IN NATIONAL BUDGETS OF THE FUNDS TO FILL THESE REQUIREMENTS.

--AGREE EARLY ON THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMONLY FUNDED PROGRAMS AND COST-SHARING OF FUNDS FOR THEIR SHARES. IF SUCCESSFUL, SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD AVOID THE MISTAKES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED IN AEW, WHERE, IN CONTRAST TO THE F-16 PROGRAM, A SPECIFIC MILITARY REQUIREMENT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED EARLY ON, AND WHERE WE ATTEMPTED TO SUPERIMPOSE THE COST ON ESTABLISHED EUROPEAN BUDGETARY PLANS. SPECIFICALLY, START
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 11 OF 12 310354Z

NOW TO DEVELOP PLANS TO COORDINATE EXPENSIVE FUTURE EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS WITH EUROPEAN PLANS AND BUDGETING SYSTEMS, THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS BEING OUR OFFERS TO NATO OF THE PATRIOT (FORMERLY SAM-D), A REPLACEMENT SYSTEM, AND OF THE NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, A NEW CAPABILITY.

--GIVE URGENT ATTENTION TO THE TWO-WAY STREET. LICENSED PRODUCTION OR COPRODUCTION OF US DEVELOPED SYSTEMS MAY BE A PROMISING APPROACH, AND THE EXPERTISE ACQUIRED BY US ELEMENTS, GOVERNMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL, WITH F-16 AND ROLAND II MAY MAKE US A NATURAL LEADER FOR FUTURE EFFORTS. WE NOTE THAT AT THE MARCH MEETING IN ROME, ALL IEPG MEMBERS, INCLUDING FRANCE, REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE, AND AGREED TO SOME EARLY APPROACHES TO THE US REGARDING EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND A LICENSING AGREEMENT FOR MANUFACTURING M735 105MM TANK AMMUNITION IN EUROPE.

--FOR THE SHORT TERM, CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE WITH CONGRESS THOSE LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS THAT COULD ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS IN NATO, THEREBY SIGNALLING OUR ALLIES THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT REMOVING LEGISLATIVE IMPEDIMENTS AND THAT WE EXPECT A SIMILAR RESPONSE FROM THEM. FOR THE LONGER TERM, CONSIDER HOW NATO'S PLANNING SYSTEM CAN BE MODIFIED TO MAKE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS SYSTEMATIC.

5) IMPROVING NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE.

WE ASSUME THE US WILL WISH TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO RATIONALIZE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE IN THE PERIOD AHEAD. IN DOING SO, THE PRESERVATION OF ALLIED CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 11 OF 12 310354Z

SHOULD BE A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE OF US POLICY--IN ORDER
TO ASSURE ACCEPTANCE OF CHANGES IN THE
NUCLEAR AREA AND ALSO TO CONTINUE PROGRESS

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01833 12 OF 12 310357Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /095 W
-----310426Z 077488 /22

R 301855Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2551
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION USBERLIN
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSARE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION OECD PARIS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01833 12 OF 12 310357Z

S E C R E T SECTION 12 OF 12 USNATO 1833

TOWARDS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ENHANCING CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE.

THE ALLIES HAVE REGISTERED THEIR MAIN CONCERNS, WHICH WILL BEAR ON ANY CHANGES THE US WANTS TO EFFECT IN THE NUCLEAR FILED:

(A) A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A STRONG AND VISIBLE TNF POSTURE IN WHICH EUROPEANS WILL HAVE A ROLE, AND (B) A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A PRIMARY FOCUS ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE OF ANY CHANGES. THESE CONCERNS ARE INTENSIFIED BY THE GROWING SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR THREAT.

WE SEE TWO BROAD AREAS AROUND WHICH TNF ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO CENTER:

A. DEPLOYMENT LEVELS. WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES SENSE A DESIRE BY THE US TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. WHILE IN PAST DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE SOUGHT TO DISCOURAGE THE BELIEF THAT NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT LEVELS ARE SACROSANCT, THE ALLIES ATTRIBUTE GREATER SIGNIFICANCE THAN THE US TO NUMBER PER SE AND, OF COURSE, NATO'S NEGOTIATING POSITION IN MBFR MAKES THE STOCKPILE LEVEL A MATTER OF POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. FACTORS SUCH AS IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY, FUNDING CONSTRAINTS, DEPLOYMENT OF NEW WEAPONS, AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ALL PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR RESTRUCTURING THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE DOWNWARD SOMEWHAT, WHILE PRESERVING ESSENTIAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES; BUT SHOULD THE US MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION, WE BELIEVE IT OUGHT TO --PROCEED GRADUALLY, USING CAREFULLY STRUCTURED CONSULTATIONS DIRECTED TOWARD ACHIEVING A COMMON APPRECIATION OF MILITARY SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01833 12 OF 12 310357Z

REQUIREMENTS;

--TAKE ACCOUNT OF NATO'S NEGOTIATING POSITION IN MBFR.

B. STOCKPILE COMPOSITION. THERE IS NOW DEPLOYED IN NATO A BROAD RANGE OF SYSTEMS, SEVERAL OF WHICH, AS WE HAVE TOLD THE ALLIES, ARE BASED ON RELATIVELY OBSOLESCE TECHNOLOGY. WE HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED TO THE ALLIES THAT NATO SHOULD CONSIDER PLACING LESS EMPHASIS ON "DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS." THERE ARE VARIOUS FACTORS, INCLUDING ADVANCES IN CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY (E.G., AIR DEFENSE, PGMS) AND INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF POSEIDON, WHICH COULD LEAD TOWARD MODIFICATION OF NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE MIX. THE COSTS AND INCREASED CAPABILITIES OF MODERNIZED

WEAPONS INDICATE THAT REPLACEMENTS WILL BE MADE
IN VARYING PROPORTIONS TO EXISTING SYSTEMS, AND
THE EFFORT TO ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY OF NATO'S
TNF POSTURE IS LIKELY TO AFFECT THE RETENTION OF
CERTAIN STOCKPILE ELEMENTS. AS THE STOCKPILE
MIX EVOLVES DURING THE COURSE OF ACHIEVING A
MORE EFFECTIVE TNF, WE SHOULD

--REMAIN SENSITIVE TO THE EUROPEAN

DESIRE TO CONTINUE PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY IN
THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT;

--SEEK TO ACHIEVE ALLIED SUPPORT FOR US
PROGRAMS THROUGH FRANK CONSULTATIONS;

--EXPLOIT STUDIES NOW UNDERWAY IN NATO
AND BUTTRESS ANY NEW INITIATIVES WE MAY WISH TO
MAKE WITH SIMILAR US-NATO STUDY EFFORTS.

C. PUBLIC SUPPORT.

FINALLY, LET US CONTINUE THE TASK OF EDUCATING
WESTERN PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS, ESPECIALLY YOUTHS
AND LABOR, ABOUT THEIR STAKE IN NATO. WE HAVE
ADDRESSED THIS CHALLENGE IN DETAIL IN OTHER
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01833 12 OF 12 310357Z

MESSAGES AND BELIEVE THAT OUR EFFORTS OVER THE
PAST YEAR, AS WELL AS THE PROGRAMS SUPPORTED BY OUR
EMBASSIES IN NATO CAPITALS, PLACE US ON THE RIGHT
TRACK. NEVERTHELESS, SUSTAINED LONG-TERM EFFORTS
WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE PUBLIC SUPPORT
ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE MUST REST. STRAUSSER-HUPE'

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 30-Aug-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 30-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977NATO01833
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: n/a
Format: TEL
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197703110/baaabcqp.tel
Line Count: 1546
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Message ID: 6da001b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 29
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) CERP 0001, (NOTAL) (B) 76 USNATO 6625 (DTG 021149Z DEC 76) (C) USNATO 744 (DTG 111045Z FEB 77) (NOTAL)
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2963943
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PARM- ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT PART I
TAGS: NATO, PFOR, PARM
To: STATE SECDEF MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/6da001b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009